IN THEIR POLICY FORUM "NATIONAL
forests in the Amazon" (30 Aug., p. 1478), A. Veríssimo et al. seem assured that a new system of national forests will solve the problems of uncontrolled forest exploitation in the Brazilian Amazon. Unfortunately, we are far less optimistic. Attached to the laudable effort to develop an expanded network of national forests is an ill-advised plan to harvest timber on half of that land through a system of forest concessions. This plan apparently has been formulated without regard to the widespread problems of forest concessions in developing countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) and will provide the largescale forest industry with subsidized access to substantial remaining old-growth tropical forests of Amazônia.
The decision to adopt concessions is based on the mistaken premises that harvesting on public lands is more profitable than harvesting on private lands and that the government of Brazil will be better able to monitor forest industry activities, thereby reducing illegal harvesting and increasing the adoption of sustainable forest management practices. In fact, concessions may have considerable unintended and negative side-effects, many of which have so far escaped serious discussion.
Some complications that may arise include the following: subsidized timber production from concessions may crowd out legal logging on private lands; monitoring concessions will add costly administrative and professional responsibilities for which the government is unprepared; concessions will not deter illegal logging; and they will give preferred access to large-scale producers while missing opportunities to direct industry benefits to private land holders.
The recent effort by the Ministry of the Environment through its National Forestry Program is commendable. They are consulting the public and entertaining a variety of opinions in a transparent manner. The products of this effort, however, are as yet inadequate for a policy decision that encompasses the largest tropical forest of the world. National forests for the Brazilian Amazon are a good ideathey will provide initial protection for vast areas of the forest-but the Brazilian government must think carefully before allowing industrial harvest of these forests.
Response

MERRY ET AL. EXPRESS DOUBTS THAT
Brazilians have the capacity to overcome the predatory and illegal logging that could occur within its new system of National Forests (Flonas (1) . Given the current demand of 28 million m 3 year −1 , most timber will have to come from disputed or unclaimed public lands (45% of Amazonia), where uncertain tenure makes sustainable management unlikely without Flona status (2) .
There is strong political support for expansion and consolidation of Flonas and other protected areas in the Amazon (3). Risks inherent in implementing Flonas are being addressed through new concession and reformed monitoring systems that the government will enforce. The Flona system is designed to break the status quo of predatory logging wherein loggers extract timber from unclaimed public lands without paying fees. Stumpage fees will be used to strengthen management, monitoring, and administration of Flonas. A portion may also be returned to local communities. Flonas will therefore benefit local economies and forest conservation much more than current practices that catalyze deforestation and illegal logging without providing sustainable socio-economic benefits. playing field was not appropriate. Instead, we have been drafted into collaborative networks, which have grown in size from three to five groups at the outset to the current norm of six to ten "collaborating" labs in the currently running projects. In the brave new Framework 6, the EU is now poised to take a great leap forward into an era of "networks of excellence" (whatever that means) comprising tens to hundreds of researchers. If one compares this to the strategy taken by an organization that actually has some experience in funding international networks of excellence based solely on scientific criteria, it is interesting to note that the Human Frontier Science Program Organization has an upper limit of four partners in the networks that it funds.
The EU and the Dinosaur
There is, however, one ray of light in the eurotunnel. The new meganetworks will have their own built-in dedicated administration, which will act as a buffer between the scientist pawns and the central eurocracy in Brussels. As a matter of fact, this strategy is already being implemented for the current "mininetworks," with the recent appointment of outside project technical assistants to help the central Framework program office perform its tasks. The immediate evolutionary analog that springs to mind is the dinosaur that required two brains-one in the head to coordinate strategy and one based near the tail to control "production." And we all know what happened to the dinosaurs. Response THE LETTERS FROM MITCHELL AND REICH and Ausubel and Waggoner highlight different aspects of the need for multifactor global change experiments with complete ecosystems, like that discussed in our Report. The suggested role for pathogens illustrates the importance of studying a real ecosystem with the complete suite of the potentially important agents. Experiments with artificial or simplified ecosystems run the risk that responses are distorted by the absence of a key regulator. The concern about the choice of experimental treatments emphasizes the value of observations across a range of appropriate treatments. Experiments with multiple global changes address the fundamental nature of global change and make it feasible to assess the generality of the results and the sensitivity of the treatments.
MIKE FAINZILBER
L E T T E R S
The suggestion from Mitchell and Reich that pathogens might be involved in the CO 2 responses we discussed is an interesting possibility. Although we did not see visible signs of leaf or root pathogens, we do not have evidence to establish that pathogens were not involved. We intend to quantify pathogens in future observations of the Jasper Ridge Global Change Experiment.
Ausubel and Waggoner feel that "a suite of realistic changes," a phrase from This Week in Science, is an inaccurate characterization of the experiment we described. The Jasper Ridge Global Change Experiment was designed to explore the effects of four potentially important aspects of a possible future at approximately doubled atmospheric CO 2 . This concentration is close to the middle of the range for IPCC reference scenarios for 2100 (1) and enough of a standard in global-change research to facilitate comparisons among experiments. The four global-change factors are elevated CO 2 , warming, increased precipitation, and increased N deposition, with elevated and ambient levels of each. Our experimental warming is at the low end of the IPCC range for doubled CO 2 (1) . The nitrogen deposition is at a level not uncommon in Northern Europe today (2) , and the precipitation change is somewhat larger than that observed by Snyder et al. (3) in a recent climate-model study of California responses to doubled CO 2 . The elevated level of each of the four global-change factors is broadly consistent with a doubled-CO 2 world, recognizing that global changes in temperature, precipitation, and N deposition are less certain and likely to be more spatially heterogeneous than changes in atmospheric CO 2 (1). Because we studied treatments with all possible combinations of ambient and elevated levels of the four factors, we actually explored a wide range of possible futures. The treatment with all four factors at elevated levels was one of the 16 treatments, as was the treatment with warming and elevated CO 2 , but ambient precipitation and N deposition, and so forth. This diversity of treatments is critically important for assessing the generality of results, isolating controlling factors, and untangling interactions. 
